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EEGThe mirror neuron theory of action understanding makes predictions concerning how the
limited motor repertoire of young infants should impact on their ability to interpret others’
actions. In line with this theory, an increasing body of research has identiﬁed a correlation
between infants’ abilities to perform an action, and their ability to interpret that action as
goal-directed when performed by others. In this paper, I will argue that the infant data does
by no means unequivocally support the mirror neuron theory of action understanding and
that alternative interpretations of the data should be considered. Furthermore, some of this
data can be better interpreted in terms of an alternative view, which holds that the role of
the motor system in action perception is more likely to be one of enabling the observer to
predict, after a goal has been identiﬁed, how that goal will be attained.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Human infants provide a compelling opportunity to explore the hypothesis that the mirror neuron system plays a func-
tional role in action understanding. While the term ‘action understanding’ is used in different ways throughout the literature
on mirror neurons, its most common usage seems to be synonymous with ‘goal understanding’. That is, mirror neurons are
proposed to enable the observer to infer the immediate target, or goal, of an action (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Since ‘goal
understanding’ is an ability that young infants are believed to possess, a promising test of the mirror neuron theory of action
understanding is to ask whether the limited, but developing, motor capabilities of infants, inﬂuence their capacity to inter-
pret others’ actions as goal-directed. The process of identifying the goal of observed movements is proposed to happen via a
mechanism that directly matches an observed movement onto a pre-existing motor representation of that action in the ob-
server (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), or which codes the goal of the action in motor terms (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia,
2010). An infant lacking a motor representation of the observed movement (because they have never performed that action)
would thus presumably have no motor representation onto which they could map that movement. Therefore, the hypothesis
that the mirror neuron system plays a role in action understanding via such a mechanismmakes clear predictions about how
the motor limitations experienced by young infants might impact on their ability to make sense of others’ actions. As both
types of sensory-motor transformation would require that the observer accesses a corresponding motor representation
(either of the movements or the goal), an infant without motor experience with an action would not have access to a cor-
responding motor representation, and so should be unable to make sense of the observed action.
Independent of work on mirror neurons, a body of work had already emerged which suggested a relationship between
infants’ experience with an action and their ability to understand that action when performed by others. This work has sincee, which
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& Ferrari, 2011), and has motivated numerous other infant studies aimed at conﬁrming this hypothesis for the function of
mirror neurons. Indeed, many infant studies have produced new data consistent with the hypothesis that mirror neurons
support goal understanding. However, in the haste to promote the data as support for the theory, little attention has been
given either to alternative interpretations of the data, or to other data which fail to support the theory. For example, despite
the reported relationship between infants’ action experience and their goal understanding, numerous studies have demon-
strated goal understanding for actions for which infants could not possibly recruit a corresponding motor representation.
Rather than an attempt to understand the existence of both supporting and non-supporting data within any alternative
framework, data inconsistent with the theory has tended to be ignored1. Thus, the primary aim of this paper is to critically
examine the claim that infant data provide strong evidence for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding, and to situate
infant data within an alternative theory of the function of the motor system during action observation.
2. Evidence from infants
The claim that infant behaviour provides evidence for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding is based on the
apparent relationship between infant’s understanding of goals and their own motor abilities. The initial impetus for this
claim came from pre-existing data demonstrating that infants could better attribute a goal to others’ object-directed actions
if those actions were performed by a human hand behaving in a typical way than if they were performed by a mechanical
claw or stick (Woodward, 1998), or even a human hand behaving in an atypical fashion (e.g. approaching the object with the
back rather than the front of the hand) (Woodward, 1999). The importance of experience was directly tested in a study by
Sommerville and colleagues in which 3-month-old infants, who ordinarily do not reach for objects and do not appear to
interpret others’ actions as goal-directed, were given training with ‘grasping’ objects. The authors placed Velcro gloves on
infant’s hands which, when they swiped their hands in the vicinity of objects, would result in them inadvertently ‘picking
up’ those objects. After this training, infants’ goal-attribution abilities were tested, and only those infants who had this train-
ing experience could interpret the action of a gloved-hand as goal-directed (Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005).
While not aimed at testing the mirror neuron theory of action understanding, these ﬁndings are certainly compatible. If mir-
ror neurons indeed lead to goal understanding by recruiting a corresponding motor representation, the presumed effect of
training in 3-month-olds was to provide themwith a motor representation onto which they could match the observed action
and understand its goal.
Following this, several studies aimed to test the hypothesis that infant’s goal understanding was dependent on their being
able to exploit a motor representation, acquired via ﬁrst-person experience, of whatever action they were observing. As a
measure of goal understanding, Falck-Ytter and colleagues asked whether infants would evidence prediction of the outcome
of an action commensurate with their abilities to perform that action (Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von Hofsten, 2006). Goal
understanding was operationalized as eye movements arriving at the location of the outcome of the action before the out-
come was achieved. Infants observed either a human hand repeatedly placing balls in a bucket, or self-propelled balls fol-
lowing the same trajectory into the bucket. The authors found that older infants, who would likely be able to place
objects into containers themselves, did generate predictive saccades towards the goal of the observed action. However,
younger infants who were unlikely to be able to place objects in containers themselves did not show anticipatory saccades,
suggesting that they were not able to infer the goal of this action. Furthermore, neither older nor younger infants generated
anticipatory saccades when the movements observed were executed by self-propelled balls. Subsequent work has extended
these ﬁndings by conﬁrming that the ability to place objects into containers is indeed correlated with the ability to generate
anticipatory saccades towards the outcome of the action when performed by others (Cannon, Woodward, Gredeback, von
Hofsten, & Turek, 2011), and other work has shown that the maturity of infants’ reaching is correlated with their ability
to interpret a reach as goal-directed in others (Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). These ﬁndings are interpreted as support for
the mirror neuron theory of action understanding and hypothesized to reﬂect the importance of being able to access a motor
representation of the observed action in order to understand that action as goal-directed.
In what follows, I will suggest a number of reasons why the data from infants is not unequivocal support for the mirror
neuron theory of action understanding and suggest that such an interpretation is premature in the absence of further data.
3. Action speciﬁcity
While it has been shown that an infant’s experience and competence with an action is related to their ability to interpret
that action when performed by others, the speciﬁcity of this relationship has not been demonstrated. That is, we do not know
whether it is speciﬁcally experience with the observed action that is crucial, or whether motor maturity more generally
might facilitate action prediction. We do not know whether it is experience placing objects in containers that enables infants
to predict the outcome of someone else placing objects in containers (Cannon et al., 2011; Falck-Ytter, Gredeback, & von Hof-
sten, 2006), or whether those infants who can place objects in containers are also more adept at other motor skills, and1 This data is often interpreted as resulting from an alternative, less important mechanism which results in a goal understanding that is inferior to that
derived from a mirror mechanism (e.g. Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004).
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action skill and predictive saccades during action observation to be evidence that predictive saccades reﬂect recruitment
of corresponding motor plans, one would need to demonstrate that it is speciﬁcally skill with the observed action that leads
to this improvement.
4. What is special about self-produced actions?
Infants can acquire experience with actions either from performing those actions themselves, or, through observing those
actions performed by others. Consistent with the mirror neuron theory of action understanding, the experience acquired
through action production appears to be superior to that acquired through action observation alone (Sommerville, Hilde-
brand, & Crane, 2008). If action understanding requires access to a motor representation of that action, then experience per-
forming rather than observing that action would be crucial. However, this only provides incontrovertible evidence for the
mirror theory if we can be sure that it is the addition of a motor representation generated from self-produced actions that
is responsible for infants being better able to understand these actions when performed by others. What else, apart from a
motor representation, could self-produced actions provide that other-produced actions could not? One possibility is that the
experience obtained from self-produced actions provides a better learning opportunity than that obtained from other-pro-
duced actions. For example, children learn the labels for objects better when labelled objects are being manipulated by
themselves, compared to when they are being manipulated by someone else (Yu & Smith, 2012), and information that is re-
ceived by infants in response to their requests appears to be better retained than unsolicited information (Begus, Gliga, &
Southgate, in preparation). One could hypothesize various reasons as to why self-produced information is better assimilated
than other-produced information. For example, infants, like adults, may be more likely to learn information that they had a
hand in eliciting (Kang et al., 2009), or self-produced effects may be especially arousing for infants (e.g. Lewis, Sullivan and
Brooks-Gunn, 1985). Whatever the reason, the point is that there could be numerous explanations for why actions, with
which the infant has ﬁrst-person experience, are more readily understood when performed by others, only one of which
is the availability of a motor representation onto which the observed action can be mapped.
5. How goal understanding is operationalized
Perhaps the most important reason why the infant data does not provide incontrovertible evidence for the mirror neuron
theory of action understanding is that there are a number of reasons to question the assumption that what is taken as evi-
dence of action understanding or a lack thereof, is really that. The interpretation of infant data as support for this theory is
heavily dependent on the assumption that a particular behaviour reﬂects a goal attribution, and an absence of that behaviour
reﬂects a failure to attribute a goal. The evidence discussed so far comes from two paradigms, one using infant looking-time
as evidence of goal attribution and the other using infant predictive gaze. In the following sections, I will examine whether
behaviour on these paradigms really provides the kind of evidence that the mirror neuron theory of action understanding
requires.
5.1. The evidence from looking-time
In the ﬁrst paradigm (Woodward, 1998), infants observe an agent repeatedly choosing one of two objects and then, after
the objects have switched location, either continuing to choose the same object (in a new location) or switching her choice to
the previously un-chosen object. When this action is a familiar reaching action, infants typically spend more time looking at
the action towards the new object than the action towards the old object, even though, because of the location switch, the
action towards the old object entails a change in path from what infants had seen during familiarization. The fact that infants
look longer at the new object-directed action suggests that they had encoded the familiarization action in terms of the goal
object, rather than other features like location of reaching. However, although the assumption that infants’ looking behaviour
reﬂects a goal attribution is rarely questioned, it is important to establish its validity, given that the argument that infants’
behaviour provides support for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding relies on this assumption.
In a recent paper, Hernik and Southgate (2012) provide data that question the assumption that this paradigm reﬂects a
goal attribution that could be generated by mirror neuron activity. One exception to infants’ expectation that an agent who
has previously approached a particular target will continue to approach that target is if that target was initially approached
in isolation, rather than as one of a pair of objects (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, 2007). The accepted interpretation of this caveat
is that, while infants interpreted the approach towards the solitary object as goal-directed, they simply do not know which
one the agent will approach now that there is a new object in the scene. In the classic two-choice paradigm, the infant has
evidence that the agent does not choose the ignored object, but in the solitary object condition, they have no information as
to the agent’s disposition towards any new object, and so do not know whether she might actually prefer this one when it is
available. The problem with this interpretation is that, as a mechanism of goal attribution, it would surely fail. One can imag-
ine many situations where a goal attribution, which should endure the appearance of new potential targets for which the
observer might lack information concerning the agent’s disposition (Hernik & Southgate, 2012), would be abandoned if such
information was necessary. For example, imagine an agent (A) chasing another (B) down a busy street. Under the Luo and
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abandon their goal attribution, and no longer expect A to continue chasing B. Thus, it is difﬁcult to see how a mechanism
which requires up-to-date dispositional information could support goal attribution. In fact, it turns out not to be the case
that infants require knowledge of the agent’s disposition towards all possible targets in order for them to generate an expec-
tation concerning which target the agent should approach. Another paradigm which proposes to demonstrate goal under-
standing in infants is based on the interpretation of efﬁcient action (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). In this paradigm, infants
observe an agent repeatedly jumping over an obstacle to approach a target. In test trials, the obstacle is removed and infants
see the agent either approaching the target with the same detour jumping action, or executing a straight path to the target.
Despite the fact that the straight path is perceptually novel relative to the jumping action, infants appear to expect the agent
to execute a straight path towards the goal, looking longer towards the jumping agent whose action is inefﬁciently related to
the goal (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995). Thus, infants can exploit action efﬁciency as a cue to goal-directedness.
Now, if we make the approach to a solitary object an efﬁcient action (by having the agent detour around a barrier on its ap-
proach), infants then continue to expect the agent to approach the same target object even in the presence of a new object
towards which the infant has no knowledge of the agent’s disposition (Hernik & Southgate, 2012). The fact that the infant
continues to expect the agent to act on the same target irrespective of the arrival of new targets is consistent with the infant
having attributed a goal to the agent. Similar effects have been reported by Biro (Biro, Verschoor, & Coenen, 2011) and when
a different kind of alternative cue to goal-directedness is added to a solitary approach event (Luo, 2011). What this data sug-
gests is that it is the presence of ‘choice’ (i.e. selecting one of two available objects) that is enabling infants to attribute a goal
on the standard two-target paradigm, rather than simply the reach towards the object (as, in isolation, this does not seem to
lead to an enduring goal attribution). That infants require this ‘choice’ or preference information in order to attribute an
enduring goal presents a problem for those who wish to use infant’s behaviour as evidence in support of the mirror neuron
theory of action understanding. If a direct reach to the object does not result in a goal attribution, but rather other cues like a
selective reach, or efﬁcient action, are necessary, then it is difﬁcult to see how mirror neurons could be playing a role in in-
fant’s goal attribution. Mirror neurons are hypothesized to enable the direct understanding of the action through a process of
simulation, but in this paradigm, goal understanding appears to be mediated by the agent’s ‘choice’ or preference.
5.2. The evidence from eye tracking
Infant’s failure to attribute goals to a direct approach in the absence of additional cues such as choice or efﬁciency of the
action has implications for other data interpreted as support for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding. While the
success of 12-month-olds in predicting the goal of a hand action but their failure to predict the goal of a self-propelled ball is
consistent with a mechanism which requires access to a motor representation for goal understanding, it is also possible that
the condition with self-propelled balls lacked sufﬁcient cues that the action was goal-directed. The direct movement of the
balls into the bucket is devoid of any cues to efﬁciency of action in the same way as a direct path to a solitary object (Hernik &
Southgate, 2012). While those who interpret infant’s predictive gaze as support for the mirror neuron theory of action under-
standing would likely argue that such cues are also lacking in the hand condition, it may be that, by 12 months of age, placing
actions are assumed to be goal-directed based on experience of seeing hands acting in goal-directed ways (Biro & Leslie,
2007). For unfamiliar agents like self-propelled balls, further cues to goal-directedness may be required – such as evidence
that the ball’s actions are efﬁciently related to the goal. In fact, a recent study has demonstrated that if a self-propelled ball
detours over an obstacle en route to its goal, then 13-month-olds do evidence predictive gaze shifts to the goal (Biro, in
press). These data suggest that it may not be the absence of a motor representation that precludes goal attribution in the
self-propelled ball condition, but an absence of cues that indicate the movement is goal-directed.
However, even if these actions did contain sufﬁcient cues for infants to interpret them as goal-directed, there are still rea-
sons to question the assumption that predictive eye movements reﬂect a goal prediction achieved by a motor process. While
the presence of predictive saccades have been cited as evidence in themselves of a motor contribution to goal understanding
(Flanagan & Johansson, 2003), they may equally be mediated by conceptual knowledge of actions and their likely outcomes.
For example, a commonly used paradigm in adults involves observers watching a hand approaching a small and a large ob-
ject (Ambrosini, Costantini, & Sinigaglia, 2011; Costantini, Ambrosini, Cardellicchio & Sinigaglia, in press). When the hand is
pre-shaped so that it is in a whole-hand grasp, observers generate saccades towards the large object in advance of the hand
arriving at that object, but when the hand is closed into a ﬁst, observer’s eye movements do not show evidence for prediction
of the goal. The authors argue that the grasping hand provides motor information which presumably can be matched to a
motor representation associated with large objects whereas the closed hand does not provide any motor information that
would lead to the prediction that one object is more likely to be the target than the other. However, it is also likely that
we have accumulated experience that hands in whole-hand grasps are more likely to be reaching for bigger objects than
smaller objects, but it is unlikely that we would have any associated outcome for a hand approaching objects in a ﬁst shape.
There is no inherent reason why predictive saccades should be interpreted as supporting one hypothesis over the other.
Nevertheless, studies do show that if the motor system is unavailable, even adults fail to make predictive saccades to-
wards a familiar action outcome. For example, studies using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) have shown that if
the motor system is rendered temporarily unavailable, adult participant’s predictive saccades to goal outcomes are impaired
(Constantini, Ambrosini, Cardellicchio, & Sinigaglia, in press; Elsner, D’Ausilio, Gredeback, Falck-Ytter, & Fadiga, 2013). These
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generating a goal prediction. However, while these data clearly do suggest a role for the motor system in predictive tasks,
what kind of prediction it is involved in generating is ambiguous. The ability to predict the goal of an action also permits
one to predict a likely way in which that goal will be fulﬁlled; the path that the action will take en route to this goal and
the kinematics involved (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). In an action such as a direct reach for an object, the location of saccades
reﬂecting a goal prediction and those reﬂecting a prediction about how that goal will be achieved would be the same. While
saccadic data cannot distinguish these two possibilities, only if they reﬂected a process of goal prediction would they be sup-
port for the mirror theory of action understanding. The same criticism applies to the infant studies using predictive saccades
as evidence for motor involvement since in all studies the path direction and the goal location are the same.
While the presence of predictive saccades towards an action outcome surely implies that the observer has generated a
goal prediction regardless of whether they reﬂect the process of goal prediction, an absence of predictive saccades does
not imply that no goal prediction has taken place. In order to generate a predictive saccade, an observer would not only need
to generate a prediction (concerning either the goal or the action path), but they would also need to disengage from what-
ever they were currently attending to. While action familiarity might facilitate predictive saccades because generating pre-
dictive saccades may require the availability of a motor program, action familiarity might also facilitate attention
disengagement. Since infants receive both motor and visual feedback from self-produced actions (Del Giudice, Manera, &
Keysers, 2009), actions that the infant can produce would be more visually familiar than actions that they cannot produce.
In studies measuring predictive saccades, the test of success is the speed with which the observer generates saccades away
from a salient moving stimulus (e.g. a hand, mechanical claw or self-propelled ball) towards the action end point. The ability
to visually disengage from an interesting stimulus, thought to reﬂect endogenous attention control, continues to improve
across the ﬁrst year of life, with infants at 7 months being slower to disengage than infants at 14 months (Elsabbagh
et al., in press). Thus, an alternative explanation for the difference in predictive saccades in the familiar and unfamiliar action
conditions of the studies discussed above is that they reﬂect infant’s developing capacity for attention disengagement. While
the human action is likely highly familiar to infants, the mechanical claw (or any other non-familiar action), by virtue of its
novelty, may be more difﬁcult for infants to disengage from, and thus more difﬁcult to generate predictive saccades away
from. Furthermore, 12-month-olds might simply be better at shifting their attention from a moving stimulus to a static
one than 6-month-olds. A possible test would be to occlude a portion of the movement in both conditions. Occluding the
salient movement element may make it easier for infants to visually disengage from the action and saccade towards the out-
come. If predictive saccades result from access to a corresponding motor representation then occlusion of the movement
should have no effect and the results should be the same. In all of the studies using predictive saccades as a measure of goal
understanding, the observed action has been something that the infants cannot produce themselves, and is unlikely to have
ever seen before (i.e. self-propelled balls and mechanical claws). Clues to whether it is the lack of visual or motor experience
that results in the lack of predictive saccades, could be found in looking time studies. When the measure is looking-time, 6-
month-old infants appear to more readily attribute a goal to a walking human adult (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hir-
aki, 2005), than to an animate box, or a mechanical claw (Woodward, 1998), even though both of these actions are outside of
their motor repertoire. But while they would likely have accumulated plenty of visual experience with walking adults, they
would be unlikely to have any prior visual experience with self-propelled boxes or mechanical claws.
Finally, despite not generating predictive saccades towards the target of a mechanical claw (Cannon & Woodward, 2012;
Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011), a different measure of action prediction suggests that infants do generate predictions for such
unfamiliar actions. Based on a documented correlation between motor activity and action prediction (Kilner, Vargas, Duval,
Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Southgate, Johnson, Osborne, & Csibra, 2009), we asked whether infants would exhibit motor acti-
vation when they could expect either a human hand or a mechanical claw to act (Southgate & Begus, in press). Infants were
familiarized to a hand or claw consistently approaching and ‘grasping’ one of two objects. After familiarization, infants saw
the two objects presented individually at the top of a screen with either the hand or the claw resting at the bottom of the
screen. We hypothesized that if infants could predict the goal of an action, we should see motor activation during this static
period. We used EEG to look for a reduction in the sensorimotor alpha rhythm, indicating motor activation (Hari & Salmelin,
1997; Hari et al., 1998), during this rest period and found that infants recruited their motor system when they saw the target
object, irrespective of whether the effector they saw was a hand or a mechanical claw. This suggests that even if infants fail
to make anticipatory saccades when they observe a mechanical claw approaching a target object, they can still interpret
these actions as target related. Furthermore, the presence of motor activation when infants see the target object suggests
that they are using their motor system for some part of this process. In the following section, I will discuss how data like
this – suggesting that infants recruit their motor system during a phase in which action can be predicted, irrespective of
the familiarity of that action – can be interpreted.
6. What is the role of the motor system in action observation?
I have argued that the oft-made assumption that the superiority of familiar actions for goal understanding in infancy im-
plies that the motor system plays a causal role in this goal understanding is unwarranted, and that there are various alter-
native possible interpretations that should be considered. Furthermore, the wealth of evidence suggesting that infants can
attribute goals to numerous actions for which they could not recruit a motor representation suggests that access to corre-
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understanding is the cue-based view (e.g. Biro & Leslie, 2007). As discussed throughout the preceding sections, researchers
have identiﬁed a number of different cues which infants appear able to exploit in order to identify an action as goal-directed.
These include that the action can be interpreted as efﬁciently related to an outcome, the presence of a choice or selection on
the part of the agent, action variability and salient action effects (for further discussion see Hernik & Southgate, 2012). Goals
are identiﬁed and understood based on the presence of these cues rather than the familiarity of the action. However, action
familiarity may still inﬂuence goal attribution. As Biro and Leslie (2007) have noted, familiar human actions (like reaching or
grasping) may become associated with goal-directed behaviour to the point where they become cues to goal-attribution.
Furthermore, the ease with which one can infer a goal is likely to be inﬂuenced by experience with an action; certain actions
are likely to become associated with certain outcomes (e.g. a hand in a pincer grip is likely usually followed by the picking up
of a small object rather than a large object).
While proponents of the mirror neuron theory of action understanding have conceded that these cues could be helpful for
actions that are outside of the motor repertoire of the observer, for actions for which the observer could access a motor rep-
resentation, this would be the preferred route and would result in a superior understanding of the action (Gallese et al.,
2004). However, data which demonstrate the recruitment of the motor system during the observation of non-executable ac-
tions (e.g. Southgate & Begus, in press) is difﬁcult to reconcile with this view. The motivation for positing a secondary, non-
motor route to goal understanding derives from the logical assumption that a mirror mechanism that matches form and mo-
tion could not be recruited for making sense of actions for which the observer would lack a corresponding motor represen-
tation. The fact that the motor system is recruited irrespective of action familiarity suggests that it is doing something quite
different from matching the observed action onto a corresponding motor representation.
Thus, an alternative explanation for the presence of motor activation during action observation is that it reﬂects a process
of action anticipation, or prediction. According to this view, goals are identiﬁed outside of the motor system but, once they
are, the motor system is recruited in order to predict how that goal will be achieved (Csibra, 2007; Jacob, 2009; Prinz, 2006),
including predicting the unfolding kinematics of the observed action (Kilner, 2011). Generating an action prediction is not
only crucial for basic needs like ﬂeeing a predator for whom you have identiﬁed yourself as its target, but for successful
engagement in cooperative and collaborative activities (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). This hypothesis accounts
for the fact that goal understanding itself appears possible without any reliance on corresponding motor representations,
while at the same time explaining the well-documented involvement of the observer’s motor system during predictive tasks.
For example, Schubotz and colleagues have shown that areas of the observer’s motor system are activated when they gen-
erate a wide range of predictions, even those which have no relation to action such as what tone will come next in a sequence
(Schubotz, 2007; Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002), and other ﬁndings also strongly implicate the observer’s motor system in
predictive tasks (Cross, Stadler, Parkinson, Schütz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2011; Kilner et al., 2004; Southgate et al., 2009). Further-
more, this hypothesis ﬁts well with the fact that the motor system functions in a predictive fashion during action execution
(Miall & Wolpert, 1996), and thus its predictive involvement in action observation is a natural product of its inherently pre-
dictive modus operandi.
A further hypothesis concerning how the motor system facilitates action prediction is that it operates in an emulative
fashion. Once the observer knows the goal of the agent, they can ask how they themselves would fulﬁl this goal; what motor
commands they would execute to this end, and it is this emulative process that recruits the motor system (Csibra, 2007).
Insofar as we generally attempt to achieve our goals in the most efﬁcient way possible, when the actor and observer share
the same motor capabilities, the observer will likely emulate the effect via a motor program that matches that which the
actor will actually use. However, under the emulation hypothesis, when the observer lacks the motor program that the actor
is using, they may nevertheless recruit an alternative motor program that could bring about the same outcome that the ob-
server has identiﬁed as being the goal of the action. For example, it has been shown that adults who are born without hands
recruit their foot motor region when observing hand actions (Gazzola et al., 2007), a ﬁnding that is consistent with the
hypothesis that the motor system is recruited to emulate the goal of an action. Similarly, a 6-month-old infant who lacks
a motor program for walking could identify a goal such as ‘approach target’ or ‘contact target’ based on available cues
and then recruit whatever motor program they themselves could use to bring about this goal (e.g. a motor program for
crawling or reaching).
This view of the role of the motor system is also consistent with numerous ﬁndings, including that the mirror system
appears sensitive not to the effectors used to achieve a goal, but to the goal itself (Umiltà et al., 2008). If the role of the motor
system in action interpretation were one of predicting action unfolding (post goal identiﬁcation), the ease with which the
goal can be ascribed would be crucial to the subsequent involvement of the motor system in prediction. For example, motor
system involvement in action perception is modulated by the presence of a visible goal. The fact that observation of panto-
mimed actions does not lead to motor activation (Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004) would be expected be-
cause, in the absence of a known outcome, the observer has no basis on which to predict how the action will unfold.
Similarly, the ostensibly conﬂicting ﬁnding that infants recruit their motor system while observing a mechanical claw reach-
ing for an object, suggesting that motor activation is not dependent on motor experience (Southgate & Begus, in press) and
ﬁndings in adults that expertise with an observed action such as ballet (Calvo-Merino, 2004; Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton,
2006; Orgs, Dombrowski, Heil, & Jansen-Osmann, 2008) or piano playing (Haslinger et al., 2005) results in greater motor acti-
vation can be reconciled under the prediction hypothesis. While the visible presence of a goal in the infant study and the
inclusion of known visual cues to goal attribution (see Hernik & Southgate, 2012 for further discussion of cues) could have
1120 V. Southgate / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1114–1121enabled infants to emulate the goal via an alternative motor program, only experts with knowledge of ballet sequences or
piano pieces would be able to predict how the sequence would unfold, and thus we would expect to see a relationship be-
tween expertise and motor involvement, especially during the prediction of intransitive actions.
The ease with which a goal can be identiﬁed and its effect on motor activation was also demonstrated in a recent study
with infants (Southgate, Johnson, Karoui, & Csibra, 2010). In this study, infants were shown a grasping hand or an unfamiliar
back-of-hand disappearing behind an occluder. Crucially, infants had no prior knowledge of what, if anything was behind the
occluder. Infants exhibited motor activation in the case of the grasping hand, but not when the hand was in a back-of-hand
posture. A control condition conﬁrmed that this was not simply because the infants could match the kinematics of the grasp-
ing hand but not of the back-of-hand. Instead, a possible explanation is that, while the familiarity of the grasping hand per-
mitted infants to generate a hypothesis about the likely outcome of the action (perhaps based on an association that they had
acquired during the ﬁrst 9 months of their life, in which they likely often saw grasping hands approaching objects), the unfa-
miliar back-of-hand action did not. Armed with this goal knowledge in the grasping hand condition, infants could then re-
cruit their motor system to generate a prediction concerning how that grasping action would unfold in pursuit of the goal. In
the absence of any goal knowledge for the back-of-hand condition, infants would have had no basis on which to generate a
prediction concerning how the action would unfold, and thus they did not recruit their motor system.7. Conclusions
Much has been made of the documented correlations between infant’s motor skills and their performance on tasks of ac-
tion understanding, in part because they ostensibly provide good evidence for the mirror neuron theory of action under-
standing. This paper has attempted to expose the limitations in the existing infant data as support for the mirror neuron
theory of action understanding. In an attempt to ﬁnd supporting evidence for this theory, ﬁndings which are consistent with
the theory have been hastily assimilated without sufﬁcient consideration of alternative explanations.
Advocates of the theory that actions are understood by motor matching accept that we can make sense of actions outside
of our motor experience, arguing that there is likely to be both a motor and a non-motor route to action understanding, but
that a motor route offers a ‘richer’ understanding of the action (Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). However,
there is no evidence that a ‘richer’ understanding of an action is attained via a motor route, and, given that both infants
(Southgate & Begus, in press) and adults (Cross et al., 2011; Schubotz, 2007) recruit their motor system for actions both with-
in and outside of their motor repertoire, it is not clear on what basis we should postulate two distinct routes to action under-
standing. After all, this secondary route was only suggested in response to the assumption that the motor system would not
be recruited for actions that are outside the observer’s own motor history.
The fact that infants can make sense of actions outside of their motor repertoire, and that they recruit their motor system
during the perception of non-executable actions, ﬁts better with the alternative view of action understanding. Under this
view, goals are identiﬁed on the availability of various cues, only one of which might be action familiarity. However, once
a goal is attributed, the motor system may be recruited to help the observer predict how the goal will be attained. As with
the mirror neuron theory of goal understanding, this is essentially a simulative process. However, rather than simulating the
observed movements in order to identify a goal, the observer identiﬁes the goal and then simulates a way in which this goal
might be fulﬁlled.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by a Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellowship (088427/Z/09/Z).
References
Ambrosini, E., Costantini, M., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). Grasping with the eyes. Journal of Neurophysiology, 106(3), 1437–1442.
Begus, K., Gliga, T., & Southgate, V. (in preparation). Infants learn what they want to learn.
Biro, S. (in press). The role of the efﬁciency of novel actions in infants’ goal anticipation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jecp.2012.09.011.
Biro, S., & Leslie, A. M. (2007). Infants’ perception of goal-directed actions: Development through cue-based bootstrapping. Developmental Science, 10(3),
379–398. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00544.x.
Biro, S., Verschoor, S., & Coenen, L. (2011). Evidence for a unitary goal concept in 12-month-old infants. Developmental Science, 14(6), 1255–1260.
Calvo-Merino, B. (2004). Action observation and acquired motor skills: An fMRI study with expert dancers. Cerebral Cortex, 15(8), 1243–1249. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhi007.
Cannon, E. N., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action predictions. Developmental Science, 15(2), 292–298. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-7687.2011.01127.x.
Cannon, E. N., Woodward, A. L., Gredeback, G., von Hofsten, C., & Turek, C. (2011). Action production inﬂuences 12-month-old infants’ attention to others’
actions. Developmental Science, 15(1), 35–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01095.x.
Casile, A., Caggiano, V., & Ferrari, P. F. (2011). The mirror neuron system: A fresh view. The Neuroscientist, 17, 524–538.
Constantini, M., Ambrosini, E., Cardellicchio, P., & Sinigaglia, C. (in press). How your hand drives my eyes. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst037.
Cross, E. S., Stadler, W., Parkinson, J., Schütz-Bosbach, S., & Prinz, W. (2011). The inﬂuence of visual training on predicting complex action sequences. Human
Brain Mapping. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hbm.21450.
Cross, E. S., Hamilton, A. F. deC., & Grafton, S. T. (2006). Building a motor simulation de novo: Observation of dance by dancers. NeuroImage, 31(3),
1257–1267. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.01.033.
V. Southgate / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1114–1121 1121Csibra, G. (2007). Action mirroring and action understanding: An alternative account. Sensorimotor foundations of higher cognition, 22, 427–451.
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2007). ‘Obsessed with goals’: Functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans. Acta Psychologica, 124,
60–78.
Del Giudice, M. D., Manera, V., & Keysers, C. (2009). Programmed to learn? The ontogeny of mirror neurons. Developmental Science, 12(2), 350–363. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00783.x.
Elsabbagh M., Fernandes J., Webb S.J., Dawson G., Charman T. and Johnson M. H. (in press). Disengagement of visual attention in infancy is associated with
emerging autism in toddlerhood. Biological Psychiatry , ISSN 0006-3223.
Elsner, C., D’Ausilio, A., Gredeback, G., Falck-Ytter, T., & Fadiga, L. (2013). The motor cortex is causally related to predictive eye movements during action
observation. Neuropsychologia, 51, 488–492.
Falck-Ytter, T., Gredeback, G., & von Hofsten, C. (2006). Infants predict other people’s action goals. Nature Neuroscience, 9(7), 878–879. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1038/nn1729.
Flanagan, J. R., & Johansson, R. S. (2003). Action plans used in action observation. Nature, 424, 769–771.
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396–403. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.002.
Gazzola, V., van der Worp, H., Mulder, T., Wicker, B., Rizzolatti, G., & Keysers, C. (2007). Aplasics born without hands mirror the goal of hand actions with
their feet. Current Biology, 17(14), 1235–1240.
Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naïve theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 287–292.
Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 1–29.
Hari, R., Forss, N., Avikainen, S., Kirveskari, E., Salenius, S., & Rizzolatti, G. (1998). Activation of human primary motor cortex during action observation: A
neuromagnetic study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95(25), 15061–15065.
Hari, R., & Salmelin, R. (1997). Human cortical oscillations: A neuromagnetic view through the skull. Trends in Neurosciences, 20(1), 44–49.
Haslinger, B., Erhard, P., Altenmüller, E., Schroeder, U., Boecker, H., & Ceballos-Baumann, A. O. (2005). Transmodal sensorimotor networks during action
observation in professional pianists. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17(2), 282–293.
Hernik, M., & Southgate, V. (2012). Nine-months-old infants do not need to know what the agent prefers in order to reason about its goals: On the role of
preference and persistence in infants’ goal-attribution. Developmental Science, 15(5), 714–722. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2012.01151.x.
Jacob, P. (2009). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind & Language, 23(2), 190–223.
Kamewari, K., Kato, M., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., & Hiraki, K. (2005). Six-and-a-half-month-old children positively attribute goals to human action and to
humanoid-robot motion. Cognitive Development, 20(2), 303–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2005.04.004.
Kanakogi, Y., & Itakura, S. (2011). Developmental correspondence between action prediction and motor ability in early infancy. Nature Communications, 2,
341. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms1342.
Kang, M. J., Hsu, M., Krajbich, I. M., Loewenstein, G., McClure, S. M., Wang, J., et al (2009). The wick in the candle of learning: Epistemic curiosity activates
reward circuitry and enhances memory. Psychological Science, 20(8), 963–973.
Kilner, J. M. (2011). More than one pathway to action understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 352–357. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.tics.2011.06.005.
Kilner, J. M., Vargas, C., Duval, S., Blakemore, S.-J., & Sirigu, A. (2004). Motor activation prior to observation of a predicted movement. Nature Neuroscience,
7(12), 1299–1301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn1355.
Lewis, M., Sullivan, M. W., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (2003). Emotional behaviour during the learning of a contingency in early infancy. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 3(3), 307–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.1985.tb00982.x.
Luo, Y. (2011). Three-month-old infants attribute goals to a non-human agent. Developmental Science, 14(2), 453–460.
Luo, Y., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Can a self-propelled box have a goal? Psychological Science, 16(8), 601–608.
Luo, Y., & Baillargeon, R. (2007). Do 12.5-month-old infants consider what objects others can see when interpreting their actions? Cognition, 105, 489–512.
Miall, R. C., & Wolpert, D. M. (1996). Forward models for physiological motor control. Neural Networks, 9(8), 1265–1279.
Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., Johnson, B. W., & McNair, N. A. (2004). Mu rhythm modulation during observation of an object-directed grasp. Cognitive Brain
Research, 19(2), 195–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.12.001.
Orgs, G., Dombrowski, J.-H., Heil, M., & Jansen-Osmann, P. (2008). Expertise in dance modulates alphabeta event-related desynchronization during action
observation. European Journal of Neuroscience, 27(12), 3380–3384. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2008.06271.x.
Prinz, W. (2006). What re-enactment earns us. Cerebral Cortex, 42, 515–517.
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 2(9), 661–669.
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2010). The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: Interpretations and misinterpretations, 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1038/nrn2805.
Schubotz, R. I. (2007). Prediction of external events with our motor system: Towards a new framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(5), 211–218. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.02.006.
Schubotz, R. I., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2002). Predicting perceptual events activates corresponding motor schemes in lateral premotor cortex: An fMRI study.
NeuroImage, 15(4), 787–796. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2001.1043.
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and minds moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70–76.
Sommerville, J. A., Hildebrand, E. A., & Crane, C. C. (2008). Experience matters: The impact of doing versus watching on infants’ subsequent perception of
tool-use events. Developmental Psychology, 44(5), 1249–1256. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0012296.
Sommerville, J. A., Woodward, A. L., & Needham, A. (2005). Action experience alters 3-month-old infants ‘‘perception of others’’ actions. Cognition, 96(1),
B1–B11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2004.07.004.
Southgate, V., & Begus, K. (in press). Motor activation during the prediction of non-executable actions in infants. Perspectives on Psychological Science.
Southgate, V., Johnson, M., Karoui, E. l., & Csibra, G. (2010). Motor system activation reveals infants‘‘ on-line prediction of others’’ goals. Psychological Science,
21(3), 355–359.
Southgate, V., Johnson, M. H., Osborne, T., & Csibra, G. (2009). Predictive motor activation during action observation in human infants. Biology Letters, 5(6),
769–772. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2009.0474.
Umiltà, M. A., Intskirveli, I., Grammont, F., Rochat, M., Caruana, F., Jezzini, A., et al (2008). When pliers become ﬁngers in the monkey motor system.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(6), 2209–2213.
Woodward, A. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s reach. Cognition, 69, 1–34.
Woodward, A. (1999). Infants’ ability to distinguish between purposeful and non-purposeful behaviors. Infant Behavior and Development, 22(2), 145–160.
Yu, C., & Smith, L. B. (2012). Embodied attention and word learning by toddlers. Cognition, 125(2), 244–262. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.cognition.2012.06.016.
